NATO weapons procurement speed has emerged as the central strategic question facing Western defence planners, with senior alliance officials converging on a single conclusion drawn from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: a usable capability available today reliably outperforms a technically superior system that arrives a decade too late.
The argument was made with unusual directness at a recent drone summit in Latvia, where military chiefs and procurement officials from across the alliance reached a consensus that the West’s habit of optimising for perfection has become a liability in a threat environment that no longer accommodates long development cycles.
Germany’s Pragmatic Turn and the Cost of Waiting
Heico Hübner, the vice chief of the German Army, described his country as ‘pursuing a very pragmatic approach’ focused not on ‘the perfect solution in 10 years, but usable capabilities today.’ Time, he said, is ‘a decisive factor of military credibility.’ The lesson from Ukraine, in his framing, is that innovation cycles have compressed from years to weeks: ‘adaptation no longer happens over years as in the past. Today, in many cases, it happens within weeks.’
Carsten Breuer, Germany’s chief of defense, sharpened the point around a specific timeline. Germany believes Russia could be ready to attack NATO by 2029, which means, in Breuer’s words, ‘we have to be ready as soon as possible.’ His procurement logic follows directly: it is better ‘to buy off the shelves than to procure something which has to be developed and will be here in 2035.’ Allies need, he added, ‘the advantage of speed because this urgency counts.’
That urgency is now being backed with money. World Politics Review reports that Germany’s defence spending reached $114 billion in 2025, a 24% year-on-year increase. The scale of that rise gives context to the rhetorical shift: German officials are not simply reframing procurement philosophy in speeches. The budget is moving in the same direction.
NATO Weapons Procurement Speed: The Alliance-Wide Reckoning
The procurement critique extends well beyond Germany. Gen. James E. Rainey, then the commanding general of US Army Futures Command, wrote in 2024 that ‘perfect is the enemy of good enough,’ arguing that the US was ‘allowing the aspirational to stand in the way of the doable.’ He pointed directly to the cost of delay: ‘There are technologies that would be useful in our formations right now but are not yet fielded because we are waiting until they can do even more.’
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte made the same case in blunter terms, saying the alliance makes weapons too slowly and should accept less effective ones in order to work faster. ‘Speed is of the essence, not perfection,’ he said. His illustration was precise: Ukraine approves and uses equipment rated ‘6 to 7’ out of 10, while NATO militaries insist on reaching ‘9 or 10’ before fielding anything.
Tarja Jaakkola, NATO’s assistant secretary general for defense industry, innovation, and armaments, told the Latvia summit that the alliance is examining what civilian and dual-use companies can deliver ‘faster, at scale, but also cheaper.’ Civilian technology is typically already available, she noted. ‘So we are very much talking about what is good enough.’
Industry Reading the Same Signal
The shift in official thinking is registering in the defence industry. Kristian Brost, the general manager for the US division of Robin Radar, a Dutch company that makes drone-detection radar systems, told Business Insider that the war shows an imperfect answer ‘right now, sometimes, is better than a perfect solution later.’ Ukraine, he said, is ‘in a spot where sometimes they need duct tape and rubber bands,’ and the lesson is straightforward: ‘Use what works, use what is cheap.’
The underlying driver is attritional warfare, the grinding combat that consumes large volumes of troops, weapons and ammunition over time. Russia’s willingness to prosecute exactly that kind of campaign has forced a reassessment of a Western procurement model built, since the Cold War, around smaller inventories of highly advanced equipment. Larger volumes of cheaper systems, procurable quickly, are now understood as essential alongside that high-end layer.
Sir John Stringer, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, framed the required cultural adjustment at the Latvia summit: the West needs to become ‘comfortable with procurement cycles which are faster than what we have been brought up with,’ moving away from programmes that span decades toward a posture of ‘testing, adjusting, failing and learning, procuring much, much faster than has been the case.’ The 2029 threat window Breuer cited leaves little room for anything else.